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Federal Adjudication of Facts: The New
Regime
Allen R. Kampt

The American legal system is entering a new system of
fact adjudication in federal civil practice. This new regime
of management governs how courts judge the sufficiency of
pleadings, how they determine facts, review factual determinations, and treat adjudicated facts in subsequent litigation.
This new regime is characterized by a temporal shift toward
fact adjudication at an early stage. No longer will the federal courts rely on extensive appellate review; rather, there
is a shift toward deference to district court findings. In addition, the courts are shifting from notice pleading with facts
ascertained by discovery to a close look at the factual bases
of pleadings. Other scholars have written on this phenomenon of a shifting of judicial emphasis.' No one, however, has
looked specifically at the various changes in procedure such
as new versions or new interpretations of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 9(b), 11, 52, 56 and the doctrine of issue
preclusion, as a whole. Such an examination reveals that the
legal system is entering a new era of procedure created by
the judiciary. The new procedure radically changes the fot Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. A.B., 1964, University of
California at Berkeley; M.A., 1967, University of California at Irvine; J.D., 1969,

University of Chicago.
1. Two such notable scholars are Professors Richard Marcus and Judith Resnik.
Professor Marcus has described the phenomenon in his article, The Revival of
Fact Pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L.

REV.

433 (1986) [hereinafter Marcus]. Professor Resnik, in her exhaustive study, Tiers,
57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837 (1984) [hereinafter Resnik], described a concentration of
power in the first tier of decision making, a decision to prefer "a single judge
issuing a final, authoritative decision." Id. at 884.
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cus of the rules, which formerly was to lead the case up to
trial, to one that seeks pretrial adjudication.
Upon analyzing the system of fact adjudication in the
United States as a whole, Professor Judith Resnik concluded that the courts have made a choice in favor of "closure, economy and power concentration."2 The value of judicial closure is that cases are subject to limited appellate
review. The effect of economy is that the superficially most
expedient procedure is preferred, and the result of power
concentration is that decision-making authority concerning
fact adjudication is concentrated in the trial court judge.
Since Professor Resnik's analysis in 1984, a review of recent
developments reveals that the trend toward preferring these
values of closure, economy and power concentration has become even stronger. Furthermore, the procedural system has
undergone a temporal shift of decision making toward the
earlier stages of the procedural system. This shift toward
the earlier procedural stages conflicts with the authorities
that should control the procedural system-the Seventh
Amendment and congressional enactments. The new regime
may also constitute an inferior method of adjudicating facts.
Before proceeding into the body of the paper, the reader
must consider the accuracy that is achievable in describing
the present civil procedure system. For example, two major
problems present themselves when one is addressing the
question of whether courts are now weighing the credibility
of summary judgment decisions. First, too much data exists:
a Westlaw3 check of citations to the Supreme Court's three
recent summary judgment cases in June, 1988, revealed
1,200 cites.
Second, the cases are difficult to interpret. For example, is
a court weighing evidence in a summary judgment decision
or not? Taking a case at random, City of Mt. Pleasant,
2. Resnik, supra note 1, at 844.
3. A computerized research service.
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Iowa v. Association of Electrical Co-op,4 the court of appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of
the defendants accused of violating the Sherman Antitrust
Act. The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the
defendant electrical cooperative had abused its monopoly
power. Reading the appellate opinion, the result seems obvious in that the plaintiff showed no evidence of an abuse of
monopoly power.'
Can the opinions be trusted? Many courts seem to present their views as the only ones that are rational. Would a
city go to the trouble of litigating a complex antitrust lawsuit to the point of petitioning for a rehearing en banc with
no evidence? In order to characterize accurately what the
courts are doing with the facts of a case, one would have to
investigate the record. With more than 1,200 reported cases
as of June, 1988, a complete investigation of even ten percent of the summary judgment cases would overtax any
scholar.'
This discussion must, logically, move to the trends, tendencies and characterizations of what the courts are doing.
Not every court is adopting a "new regime" of fact adjudication. The judiciary has developed a new mind-set, however, of how to adjudicate facts. A characteristic of the new
regime is looser control of trial courts, and as a result the
treatment of facts in any one case is becoming more and
more dependent on the predilections of the particular trial
judge.
4. 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988).
5. Id. at 281 (The plaintiffs accused the defendants, a group of related rural

electric companies, of price squeezing and conspiring to monopolize the wholesale
electricity market in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, § 13(a) (1982)).
6. As stated by Professor Louis, "Reported federal summary judgment decisions
now fill almost an entire volume of the United States Code Annotated. Amidst

such a profusion, one can find support for virtually any approach to summary
judgment, especially because so many of the decisions concentrate on the facts,
repeat cliches, and use sketchy analyses." Louis, Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in Constitutional Defamation Cases, 57 S. CAL. L. REV.
707, 722, n.83 (1984).
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Fact Adjudication under the Ancien Regime
A.

Notice Pleading

The ancien regime, or old system, of fact adjudication
was characterized by notice pleading, extensive discovery,
and full review. Conley v. Gibson' gave-the standard rule
concerning pleading under the ancien regime: "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief."8 Simply stated, the Conley rule was that
pleadings required no detail and that one could discover the
facts after filing a claim.9 Courts, under the ancien regime,
disfavored motions to dismiss on formal grounds, such as
the failure to state a claim.1" Professor Arthur Miller made
this observation about dismissal for the failure to state a
claim: "It is a wonderful tool on paper but have you ever
looked at the batting average of rule 12(b)(6) motions? I
think it was last effectively used during the McKinley
administration." 1
Ancien regime pleading, therefore, was to start the ball
rolling, but it did little to determine the facts at issue. Because one could rely on discovery for determining facts, an
attorney could plead only on the basis of suspicion. 12 Discovery was to determine the validity of the plaintiff's case. 3
7. 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957).
8. 355 U.S. at 45-46.
9. Marcus, supra note 1, at 434.
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
11. A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983

AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RE-

SPONSIBILITY

7-8 (1984) [hereinafter

MILLER].

12. Popofsky & Goodwin, The "Hard-Boiled" Rule of Reason Revisited, 56
ANTITRUST

L.J. 195 (1987) [hereinafter Popofsky].

13. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806 (1981).

HeinOnline -- 12 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 440 1988-1989

THE NEW REGIME

1989]

B.

Summary Judgment

Courts of the ancien regime preferred trial over summary
judgment. The Second Circuit adopted a "slightest doubt"
standard in denying summary judgment motions. 14 The Supreme Court severely limited the use of summary judgment
in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 5 Commentators and courts
have interpreted Adickes in various ways, but regardless of
its interpretation the Adickes decision did make granting
summary judgment difficult. One commentator stated that
the movant had to show the impossibility of there being any
evidence that would create a genuine issue of fact. 16
Therefore, under the ancien regime the use of summary
judgment was slighted in favor of trial. The ancien regime
concluded that the trial process, with its ability to impeach
witnesses, was the proper place for fact adjudication. The
United States Supreme Court in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System17 voiced its belief that "even handed justice"
required that a trial should be employed rather than the
granting of a summary judgment motion, at least in the
area of antitrust litigation. The Poller Court stated:
We believe that summary procedures should be used
sparingly in complex anti-trust litigation where motive
and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the
hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses
thicken the plot. It is only when the witnesses are present and subject to cross examination that their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be
appraised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by
14. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); see also Marcus,
supra note 1, n.8 at 434.
15. 398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970).
16. Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1111

(1986). Note also that, prior to Adickes, the court had summarily reversed the
granting of a summary judgment in Norfolk Monument Co. v. Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc., 394 U.S. 700, 89 S. Ct. 1391, 22 L. Ed. 2d 658 (1969).
17. 368 U.S. 464, 82 S. Ct. 486, 7 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1962).
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jury which so long has been the hallmark of 'evenhanded justice."'

C.

Directed Verdict and J.N.O.V.

Furthermore, under the ancien regime the jury, not the
judge, was to decide the facts. The Supreme Court had severely limited the scope of directed verdicts and J.N.O.V.
motions in several cases.19 Although disagreement exists as
to whether these opinions apply only to FELA and Jones
Act litigation,2" there is no doubt that cases such as Lavender v. Kurn2" and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co"2 encouraged
the trial courts to use the jury instead of dismissal or summary judgment.

D.

Appellate Review

Once decided, facts under the ancien regime were subjected to a more complicated and wider appellate review
than under the present doctrine of the new regime. A classic
case regarding the standard of review, Orvis v. Higgins,23
set forth a wide scope of appellate review in non-jury cases:
[W]e may make approximate gradations as follows: We
must sustain a general or a special jury verdict when
there is some evidence which the jury might have believed, and when a reasonable inference from that evidence will support the verdict, regardless of whether
that evidence is oral or by deposition. In the case of
findings by an administrative agency, the usual rule is
substantially the same as that in the case of a jury, the
findings being treated like a special verdict. Where a
18. 368 U.S. at 473 (citations omitted).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See
Id.
327
398
180

C.

WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

642-43 (4th ed. 1983).

U.S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 916 (1946).
U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970).
F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950).
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trial judge sits without a jury, the rule varies with the
character of the evidence: (a) If he decides a fact issue
on written evidence alone, we are as able as he to determine credibility, and so we may disregard his finding.
(b) Where the evidence is partly oral and the balance is
written or deals with undisputed facts, then we may ignore the trial judge's finding and substitute our own, (1)
if the written evidence or some undisputed fact renders
the credibility of the oral testimony extremely doubtful
or (2) if the trial judge's finding must rest exclusively
on the written evidence or the undisputed facts, so that
his evaluation of credibility has no significance. (c) But
where the evidence supporting his finding as to any fact
issue is entirely oral testimony, we may disturb that
finding only in the most unusual circumstances.24
The ancien regime also allowed for a relitigation of issues,
because of a narrow application of res judicata and collateral estoppel. For example, the requirement of mutuality
limited the application of collateral estoppel.2 5 Under the
ancien regime, therefore, adjudication of facts focused on
discovery to ascertain the facts and trials to determine them.
After the trial, the appellate courts had an extensive scope
of review, and could relitigate some factual conclusions. It is
this system that now seems like life before the Revolution,
too leisurely and inefficient for our modern world.
II.
A.

The New Regime

Dismissals of the Complaint

Despite Arthur Miller's statement that the last successful
use of 12(b)(6) was during the McKinley administration,
several commentators have described a movement away
24. Id. at 539-40 (citations omitted).
25. Cf. Park Lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed.
2d 552 (1979).
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from notice pleading and toward requirements of factually
specific allegations. Professor Richard Marcus, for example,
notes that "plaintiffs have an incentive to plead vaguely in
hopes that discovery will turn up material on which to base
a more specific charge" and that "plaintiffs with weak
claims have good reason . . . to stave off dismissal in hopes
of a settlement." 2 Acting against "pro-plaintiff biases" and
"the impulse toward vagueness," courts have become more
strict in requiring specificity. For example, in Warth v. Seldin 7 the Supreme Court required allegations concerning the
standing of parties to be supported by "particularized allegations of fact." 2 8 Lower courts have frequently required
fact pleading in three main areas: securities fraud, civil
rights cases, and conspiracy. 9 In addition, the Ninth Circuit
has adopted a requirement for specific allegations involving
protected conduct under the First Amendment."
Fact specificity has also spread to other areas. The Manual for Complex Litigation"' calls for the use of pleadings
to define and structure issues. 2 One authority notes that the
Manual "encourages judges to insist upon some definition
and structuring of issues" and criticizes notice pleading, because "real issues . . . may be clouded by imprecise or
broad allegations tolerated by notice pleading. '3 3 In antitrust suits, courts are requiring specificity:
The Supreme Court has yet to establish a general norm
requiring fact-specific anti-trust pleading, but there is
every indication of evolution toward such a norm. Pru26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
Board

Marcus, supra note 1, at 445-46.
422 U.S. 490, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1975).
Marcus, supra note 1, at 446-47.
Id. at 447-50.
Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive
of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 1976).

31. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
32. Id. at § 21, 31-33.

LITIGATION,

§ 21, 31-33 (5th ed. 1982).

33. Brunet & Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust Procedure and Substance After
Northwest Wholesale Stationers: Evolving Antitrust Approaches to Pleadings,
Burden of Proof, and Boycotts, 72 VA. L. REv. 1015, 1067 (1986).
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dent counsel for anti-trust plaintiffs should plead facts
showing anti-trust injury and supporting a hoped for
pro-se categorization with real specificity. Failure to do
so may leave the plaintiff's claims vulnerable to the defendant's motion to dismiss or motion for summary
judgment. 4
Courts also impose stringent pleading requirements on
plaintiffs who bring RICO 35 actions.3 Even after the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima v. Imrex Co., Inc., 7 almost thirteen percent of RICO cases were dismissed for
lack of particularity and more than twenty percent were dismissed for insufficient allegations of predicate offenses.3
The requirement of specificity protects defendants from
the expense of unnecessary discovery at the risk of slighting
antitrust enforcement. In the past, pleading based only on
parallel behavior would be sufficient to allow a plaintiff to
proceed with discovery. Today, however,
the litigation 'ambience' has changed and courts frequently determine that the costs to society of subjecting
defendants to 'fishing expeditions' are too great to tolerate .... Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff often must uncover prior to filing the complaint and
then plead with particularity the underlying facts to
support a valid conspiracy claim or the assumption that
the defendant has the requisite market power to injure
competition. 9
There is, thus, a movement to reinstitute fact pleading in
34. Id. at 1074.

35. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(1982).
36. See the collection of cases in Blakely & Cessar, Equitable Relief under
Civil RICO. Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will
Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 526, 590, n.239 (1987) [hereinafter Blakely].
37. 473 U.S. 479, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985).
38. Blakely, supra note 36, at 619-20.
39. Popofsky, supra note 12, at 211.
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several types of federal complaints.
B.

Rule 11 -"Well-Founded

in Fact"

The requirement of more specific pleading combines with
the recently amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 in
a synergistic fashion. In fact, it requires the plaintiff's attorney to do more factual investigation prior to filing and to
reinstitute the complaint as the first barrier in the procedural system. The Federal District Court of Delaware in In
re Ramada Inns ,Securities Litigation,'0 noted this change:
"The combined effect of rules 9(b) and 11 is that an attorney before commencing any action involving fraud or mistake must have more specific information reasonably believed to be trustworthy than would be required if she were
commencing any other kind of action."' 1
Rule 11, in fact, was changed specifically to deal with
perceived shortcomings in the notice pleading system. One
commentator describes the new Rule 11 as requiring the
lawyer to know the facts and the law, more so than under
the old Rule 11. Under the revised Rule 11 a somewhat objective standard of "reasonable inquiry"4 2 is created. Profes40. 550 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Del. 1982).
41. Id. at 1132.
42. MILLER, supra note 11, at 15-16. Professor Miller stated:

"To the best of his knowledge, information, and belief" (again, that is
as close as you can come to describing some sort of mental state)-but
here are the four critical words--"formed after reasonable inquiry." In
many ways those four words are the key to rules 7 and 11. As the

advisory committee note puts it, "formed after reasonable inquiry" is a
stop-and-think obligation. There is now a mandated obligation on the
part of an attorney to stop and think about his behavior, whether it is
pleadings, motions, discovery or what have you-to the best of his
knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry.
Now we have changed the nature of the standard. The combined effect
of these words is that the lawyer must stop and think on the basis of
the facts and the law. That is a fairly objective approach. It has got
some subjective elements to it, but it is an attempt to become more
objective. It is an attempt to say to an attorney: "You have to know
your facts and your law before you start shooting paper arrows in the
air."
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sors Frank James and Geoffrey Hazard see the amended
Rule 11 as a return to code pleading. They argue that the
return to code pleadings is indirect, but that the phraseology
of the amended Rule 11 leaves few alternatives.4 3 Rule 11,
therefore, has the capacity to overturn the Conley v. Gibson44 system of "notice pleading."
Frantz v. U.S. Powerlifting Federation45 discusses the interaction of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 11. In
Frantz, the court held that "a claim may be sufficient in
form but sanctionable because, for example, counsel failed
to conduct a reasonable investigation before filing." ' 46 The
court insisted, however, that counsel have sufficient knowledge before filing the complaint:
The complaint should contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief," Rule 8(a)(2). It is not only unnecessary but also
undesirable to plead facts beyond limning the nature of
the claim (with exceptions, see Rule 9, that do not concern us). Bloated, argumentative pleadings are a bane
of modern practice. American Nurses' Association v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986). Rule 11 requires
Id.
43. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 154-55 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter JAMES & HAZARD]. James & Hazard state:
The incidence of the strike suit has led to proposals for tightening the
pleading rules. There has not been much support for returning to code
pleading, and probably interests associated with plaintiffs' causes are
strong enough to block such a change. However, something approximating that result may be in progress indirectly. Rule 11 of the federal
rules was amended in 1983 to require that all motions and pleadings
be based on the subscribing attorney's "belief formed after reasonable
inquiry [that] it is well grounded in fact. . .

."

As some decisions sug-

gest, this language could be administered to require the pleading to
show that it is "well grounded in fact." It is difficult to see how such a
requirement could be complied with except by alleging the factual
grounds of the claim. This is a move in the direction of code pleading.
id.
44. 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957).
45. 836 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1987).
46. Id. at 1067.
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not that the counsel plead facts but that the counsel
know facts after conducting a 'reasonable investigation
and then only enough to make it reasonable to press litigation to the point of seeking discovery. Rule 11 neither
modifies the "notice pleading" approach of the federal
rules nor requires counsel to prove the case in advance
of discovery. See also Szabo, 823 F.2d 1083 (Rule 11
requires only an "outline of a case" before filing the
complaint, though it does require enough investigation
to discover that outline).47
Even though the Seventh Circuit does not require formal
fact pleading, it does require functional fact pleading. Plaintiffs must know enough facts prior to filing to avoid sanctions. The court recognizes that a fine line exists between
form and functional pleading. The court has also noted that
the requirements of Rule 11 should not prevent people who
have at least a minimally meritorious complaint, but need
discovery to help their case, from having their case heard.
This need for discovery "does not excuse the filing of a vacuous complaint."4 " Crossing the line, however, subjects the
attorney to censure and fines, a risk that can only have a
chilling effect on litigation.
C.
1.

Summary Judgment

The Summary Judgment Trio

Summary judgment practice has been spurred, if not revolutionized, by three fairly recent Supreme Court cases:
Matsushita Electric Industries v. Zenith Radio Corp.,"
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,5" and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.5 ' Commentators agree that these three cases will in47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1068.
id.
475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
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crease summary judgment use.52 As stated by Professor Jeffrey Stempel, "[tihe majority opinions read like an ode to
the wonders of summary judgment." 53
Besides making summary judgment more feasible, these
cases authorize a greater involvement of the judge in the
fact-finding process and necessarily decrease the role of the
jury. They also work to lessen the role of the trial hearing as
the central fact-finding procedure and substitute the summary judgment for the trial as a principal determiner of
fact.5"
The exact meaning of the Court's pronouncements in the
summary judgment trilogy is unclear.5 5 Celotex held that it
is sufficient for a movant to file a motion for summary judgment without attaching evidentiary material. What is a
plaintiff required to include in the response? Professor John
Kennedy gives six possible interpretations of Celotex as to
the sufficiency of the response to the defendant's motion.56
He concludes that "[tihe specific meaning of Celotex is
52. E.g., Comment, No More Litigation Gambles, 28 B.C.L. REV. 747 (1987);
Kennedy, Federal Summary Judgment, 6 REV. LIT. 227, 230 (1987); Childress, A
New Era for Summary Judgments, 6 REV. LIT. 263 (1987); Stewart, Rulings
Make Summary Judgment Possible in Complex Litigation, 196 NAT'L L.J. 22
(1986).
53. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror." The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of
Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIo
ST. L.J. 95, 106 (1988) [hereinafter Stempel].
54. Childress, A New Era for Summary Judgments, 6 REV. LIT. 263, 265
(1987) [hereinafter Childress]. Addressing the decrease in the role of the trial,
Childress states:
Summary judgment proceeding can now become less like pretrial dismissal motions and more like mini-trials-bench trials on paper. This
doctrinal development gives the green light to grants where appropriate, increases the situations in which a grant would be appropriate and
shifts the look of the motion from one of 'glorified 12(b)(6)' to preliminary directed verdict.'
Id.
55. See, e.g., Note, Summary Judgment and Circumstantial Evidence, 40
STAN. L. REV. 491 (1988) (arguing that the cases concern the use of indirect evidence in conflict with goals of the substantive law).
56. Kennedy, Federal Summary Judgment, 6 REV. LIT. 227, 245 (1987).
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somewhat inscrutable." 57 These cases clearly have a widespread effect. For example, a Westlaw search of citations of
the cases interpreting the Celotex decision in June, 1988,
produced over 1,000 cites.
The Court's opinions in these three cases will have several
effects. One effect of Celotex is that it promotes the widespread use of the summary judgment motion because a defendant may move for summary judgment without supporting materials, such as affidavits, that negate the elements of
the plaintiff's case.58 The defendant can move for summary
judgment merely by stating that discovery has revealed insufficient evidence to support plaintiff's claim. Celotex has
increased the number of situations in which a defendant can
use summary judgment because it requires so little to initiate the motion. In addition, Celotex has also shifted the
time of decision about the sufficiency of the plaintiff's case
forward from trial to the pretrial litigation stage. The result
is that the plaintiff must come up with supporting evidence
by the close of discovery. Thus the plaintiff can no longer
hope that evidence will appear at the trial. Also, shifting the
decision about the sufficiency of the plaintiff's case from
trial to pretrial, Celotex necessarily decreases the authority
of the jury because judges can screen cases before they are
presented to the jury.
2.

Evaluating the Burden of Proof

Even more damaging to the jury's role, however, is Anderson v. Liberty Lobby59 and Matsushita Electric Industries v. Zenith Radio Corp.,60 which empower the judge to

adjudicate factual issues. Anderson involved a libel suit
against Jack Anderson by a right-wing publisher and his or57. Id. at 245. On remand, the court of appeals decided that there was enough
evidence to defeat the motion. Judge Bork dissented.
58. 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
59. 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).
60. 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
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ganization, Liberty Lobby. In Anderson, the court held that
the standard of proof, in the Anderson case clear-and-convincing, must be considered in deciding a summary judgment motion. 6 ' In order to determine whether a genuine factual issue as to actual malice exists in a libel suit brought by
a public figure, a trial judge must bear in mind the actual
quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability
under New York Times v. Sullivan.6 2 The Anderson court
held: "[T]here is no genuine issue if the evidence presented
in the opposing affidavits is of insufficient caliber or quantity
to allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by
clear and convincing evidence." 3 Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must review the evidence under the substantive evidentiary burden. The trial
judge, however, is not to determine credibility. 4 Exactly
what the majority's decision on allocation of fact determination between the judge and jury will mean in practice is unclear. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote:
The Court, I believe, makes an even greater mistake in
failing to apply its newly announced rule to the facts. of
this case. Instead of thus illustrating how the rule
works, it contents itself with abstractions and paraphrases of abstractions, so that its opinion sounds much
like a treatise about cooking by someone who has never
61.
62.
63.
64.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242.
376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1964).
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251.
Id. at 255. The Court stated:

Our holding that the clear-and-convincing standard of proof should be
taken into account in ruling on summary judgement motions does not
denigrate the role of the jury. It by no means authorizes trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations on the weighing of the evidence, and
the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,
not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict.
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cooked before and has no intention of starting now.6 5
Despite the majority's statement, Anderson does take
some decision-making authority away from the jury. There
can be two versions of how the "clear-and-convincing rule"
affects factual adjudication. Either the Anderson rule empowers the judge to dismiss the case if the evidence is not
"clear-and-convincing," or the rule is a standard the jury is
to apply. The Anderson Court chose to give the decision to
the judge. In doing so, it gives the judge fact-finding powers.
Justice Brennan points out in his dissent the perceived damage that the majority decision holds for existing procedure:
In my view, if a plaintiff presents evidence which either
directly or by permissible inference (and these inferences are a product of the substantive law of the underlying claim) supports all of the elements he needs to
prove in order to prevail on his legal claim, the plaintiff
has made out a prima facie case and a defendant's motion for summary judgement must fail regardless of the
burden of proof that the plaintiff must meet. In other
words, whether evidence is "clear and convincing," or
proves a point by a mere preponderance, is for the
factfinder to determine. As I read the case law, this is
how it has been, and because of my concern that today's
decision may erode the constitutionally enshrined role of
the jury, and also undermine the usefulness of summary
judgment procedure, this is how I believe it should
remain.6"

65. Id. at 269.
66. Id. at 268. A proviso should be made in any statement about Anderson.
Appellate judges are given authority to review facts in First Amendment cases
more closely than in other cases. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 80 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1984). Thus, Anderson could be limited to the First Amendment area. The Court, however, gives
no indication of doing so.
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Judicial Evaluation of Facts

Matsushita Electric Industries v. Zenith Radio Corp.,"
encourages judicial evaluation of facts even more strongly
than does Anderson. Matsushita involved an antitrust suit
by American television manufacturers against Japanese
manufacturers. The plaintiffs' theory was that the defendants had conspired to raise prices in Japan and to sell at low
prices in the United States in order to drive out American
producers.6 8 The United States Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court and ruled that the trial court had erred in
granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment.69
The Court described the non-moving party's burden:
In the language of the rule, the non-moving party must
come forward with "specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. . . ." Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find
for the non-moving party, there is no "genuine issue for
trial." 70

Matsushita does more, however, by authorizing the trial
67. 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
68. 475 U.S. at 574.
69. Id. at 598.
70. Id. at 587 (citations omitted). Steven Childress writes that this language
makes the directed verdict test of the sufficiency of the evidence the standard for
deciding summary judgment:
With this language, the Court clearly signaled that summary judgment motions should be treated in parallel fashion to the trial motion
for directed verdict, allowing a grant if the nonmovant plaintiff fails on
substantive proof, even before trial. This suggests that the summary
judgment procedure allows weak factual claims to be weeded out, not
just factual claims that have no legal import; "genuine" allows some
quantitative determination of sufficiency of evidence. Of course, a
court still cannot resolve factual disputes that could go to a jury at
trial. Also, it must be assumed from the later language in Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, discussed below in part II, subpart B, that this review
assumes adequate discovery, so that the record is complete enough to
define issues. However, Matsushita emphasizes that a court need no
longer leave every sufficiency issue for trial or for a later directed verdict motion.
Childress, supra note 54, at 267-68.
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judge to evaluate the plausibility of the evidence. The Matsushita Court defined implausibility as a claim "that makes
no economic sense."' 71 The Court held that if the trial judge
determined that a respondent's claim was implausible under
the Court's definition, the respondents would then be required to present "more persuasive evidence to support their
claim than would otherwise be necessary. "72
The Matsushita opinion demonstrates the Court's willingness to view evidence according to its understanding of economic reality. Professor Eugene Crew writes that the validity of the Court's economic assumptions is debatable
because the Court seems to be saying that because it is irrational to speed, people do not speed. 73 The Court's basic factual assumption is that the actors are economically rational,
or wealth maximizers, and therefore irrational conduct is
unlikely.
Whether or not corporate firms seek to maximize sales is
an open question. Moreover, other societies may follow different goals:
That which 'motivates' the 'rational' alumnus of the
Chicago School of Law does not motivate everybody
71. 475 U.S. at 575.

72. Id. Childress, writing to this issue, states:
Two aspects of this approach seem new: (1) apparently "persuasiveness" can be considered by a judge before trial, and (2) "plausibility"

can be judged, with a sliding scale of proof required of a plaintiff
whose claim's plausibility varies. This means that inferences can be
weighed, at least for their absolute reasonableness or persuasiveness.
Childress, supra note 54, at 268.
73. Crew, Matsushita v. Zenith: The Chicago School Teaches the Supreme
Court a Dubious Lesson, I ANTITRUST 12 (1986) [hereinafter Crew].

74. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588-89. Specifically, the Court stated:
Any agreement to price below the competitive level requires the con-

spirators to forgo profits that free competition would offer them. The
forgone profit may be considered an investment in the future. For the
investment to be rational, the conspirators must have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of monopoly profits, more than the
loss suffered.
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else and, particularly, the average Japanese businessman. For example, respected authorities have uniformly
acknowledged that Japanese businessmen have a strong
penchant for consensus and a strong motivation to collaborate with each other if necessary to prevail against
foreign competitors. 5
Assuming rational behavior, debate still exists over the
rationality of underpricing items in order to damage the
competition, which is sometimes referred to as predatory
pricing. 76 The Court cites writings of the Chicago school of
law and economics by Robert Bork7 and Frank Easterbrook 78 as authority, while the plaintiff's expert is dismissed.
Bork and Easterbrook write: "Accordingly, in our view the
expert opinion evidence of below cost pricing has little probative value in comparison with the economic factors . . .
that suggest that such conduct is irrational. ' 79 The Court,
therefore, allows the trial judge to decide the motion to dismiss in light of his view of the probability of what
happened.
The Matsushita Court concludes by directing the court of
appeals to consider other evidence: "The evidence must
'ten[d] to exclude the possibility' that petitioners underpriced respondents to compete for business rather than to
implement an economically senseless conspiracy." 80 The
Court's holding represents a reversal of Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co.,81 in which the movants for summary judgment
had to negate the reality of the respondent's theory of the
75. Crew, supra note 73.
76. See McCall, Predatory Pricing, 33 ANTI. BULL. 1 (1987); Shepherd, Assessing "Predatory" Actions by Market Shares and Selectivity, 31 ANTI. BULL. 1
(1986).
77. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589 (citing R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX
(1978)).
78. Id. (citing Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48
CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981)).
79. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594 n.19.
80. Id. at 597-598.
81. 398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970).
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case. Matsushita also rejected, without discussion, the prior
holding of Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 2
which held that a trial was the correct procedure to determine the existence of a conspiracy.8"
Perhaps applying the Matsushita decision in other fact
situations is an over-extension. There are several easily distinguishable points in Matsushita. The plaintiffs attacked a
practice that at first glance seems to be what the antitrust
law encourages: low cost pricing. As a result, a victory for
the plaintiffs could be against substantive antitrust policy. 4
Yet, Matsushita is not limited to antitrust cases, and its authority gives support to judges evaluating the likelihood of
the evidence in comparison with their own perception of reality. The case rests on the unstated assumption that a judge
knows what is likely and what motivates a party's behavior,
even a party from another culture. The Matsushita court
also assumes that the judge is the proper person to make
such an evaluation, not the jury. Therefore, the new regime
has made the summary judgment motion easier to initiate 5
and has allowed the judge to evaluate facts in relation to
both the burden of proof86 and the court's view of reality."
4.

The Summary Judgment as Mini-Trial
The court has, in all practicality, turned the summary
82. 368 U.S. 464, 82 S. Ct. 485, 7 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1967).
83. Matsushita also rejected Poller's teaching as to the use of summary judg-

ment procedures in antitrust litigation. 368 U.S. at 473.
84. One commentator indicates that the application of Matsushita may be limited, stating: "The context of this caution makes it clear that it is not to be applied
unthinkingly to every antitrust case. Matsushita urged courts to scrutinize predatory pricing rigorously, because antitrust law is intended to encourage price competition and because predatory pricing is likely to fail." Calkins, Equilibrating
Tendencies, 74 GEo. L.J. 1065, 1126-27 (1986).
85. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265
(1986).
86. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d
202 (1986).
87. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct.
1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
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judgment motion into a mini-trial. In both the summary
judgment and directed verdict motions the trial judge must
insert the standard-of-proof question into any Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56 decision. In addition, the judge must
determine the probability of a party's allegations. Professor
Linda Mullenix states:
For if it is true, as the Court now suggests, that the
question on each motion is the same (to wit, "whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided
that one party must prevail as a matter of law"), then
trial-like burdens and substantive evidentiary standards
are clearly required. By reading backwards from the directed verdict the Court transformed summary procedure into a full trial-before-trial. With the Rule
12(b)(6) motion already in extreme disfavor, the Court
has effectively deadened the pretrial utility of summary
judgment-an ironic outcome for a Supreme Court urgently concerned with congested federal dockets and increased frivolous litigation.88
Not every court has required such a full presentation of
all the respondent's evidence. For example, the Celotex89
case on remand denied the summary judgment on the
strength of plaintiff's transcript of her late husband's testimony concerning two letters.9 ° A wise attorney, however,
would do well to present as much evidence as possible at the
summary judgment stage in order to be sure that the evidence presented meets the required standard of proof. 91
Rule 56 proceedings, therefore, have the potential to be
transformed into pretrial documentary mini-trials.
88. Mullenix, Summary Judgment: Taming the Beast of Burdens, 10 AM. J.
ADVOC. 433, 468 (1987) [hereinafter Mullenix].
89. Catrett v. Johns-Maville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd
sub nom, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d
265 (1986).
90. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 826 F.2d 33, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
91. In Catrett, the decision was 2-1, with Judge Bork dissenting.
TRIAL
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The "Out-of-the-Box" Motion

Another development of summary judgment procedure is
the use of the motion in the initial pleading by filing a summary judgment motion in lieu of an answer. Such a motion,
called an "out-of-the-box" summary judgment motion, can
put the, plaintiff in a difficult position and force him to disclose his evidence at the earliest possible procedural stage.
Such motions are already appearing in malpractice and antitrust litigation. 92 Rule 56(f), however, does allow attorneys
to gain more time to do discovery under certain
circumstances.
6.

When Affidavits are Unavailable

Should it appear from the affidavits of the opposing party
that the party cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may do one of two things. First, it may
refuse the application for summary judgment or, second, it
may order a continuance to permit discovery to continue.
Some defense counsel argue, however, that Rule 11 limits
Rule 56(f). One commentator, Laurence Popofsky, contends
that an "out-of-the-box" summary judgment motion in conjunction with Rule 11 can put the plaintiff's attorney in a
bind.93
92. Popofsky, supra note 12, at 212; Bower, Defending Motions for Summary
Judgment in Malpractice, 17 TRIAL LAW. Q. 30, 32 (1985).
93. Specifically, Mr. Popofsky states:
The plaintiff therefore no longer can plead a generalized allegation of
a conspiracy or injury to competition, in the hope of uncovering facts
in discovery to support such allegations. In other words, if the plaintiff
has satisfied its Rule 11, obligation to conduct an investigation prior to
filing the complaint and the "Rule 9(6)(b)" requirement to plead such
facts with particularly the plaintiff should be able to defeat an "out-ofthe-box" summary judgment motion merely by reference to the facts
of which it is already aware. Thus, in some cases, plaintiff's request for
further discovery under Rule 56(f) prior to a hearing or a summary
judgment motion could constitute an admission that the complaint
does not conform to Rule 11 and the district court therefore would not
abuse its discretion by denying the Rule 56(f) request. The defendant
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According to Popofsky, an "out-of-the-box" motion forces
the plaintiff's counsel to develop facts that support his case
at the initial pleading stage. Popofsky's position, taken literally, would read Rule 56(f) and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure relating to discovery, Rules 26-37, entirely out of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A Seventh Circuit
9 4 indicates
case, Frantz v. U.S. Powerlifting Federation,
that Rule 11 cannot be taken that far. Counsel must investigate thoroughly enough to have an "outline of the case,"
demonstrating that it is reasonable to proceed with discovery. Exactly where the court should draw the line is difficult
to ascertain. Aggressive defense counsel can utilize the "outof-the-box" summary judgment motion and Rule 11 to put
immediate pressure on the plaintiff and to cut off further
discovery.
Some courts, moreover, are refusing to allow more discovery time under Rule 56(f). Such refusal may be practically
unreviewable because discovery control is generally viewed
as a matter of district court discretion. For example, in Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp.," the court of appeals afshould be entitled to proceed with the motion if the plaintiff is to avoid
the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.
Popofsky, supra note 12, at 212 citing In re Continental Maritime of San Francisco, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Metal Trades District Counsel, 817 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir.
1987).
94. 836 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1987).
95. 812 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1987). Refusing additional time, the court stated:
Appellants contend that the district court improperly granted summary judgment without ruling on their motion to permit additional
discovery [under Rule 56(0]. . . . The conduct of discovery is a matter for the discretion of the district court and its decisions will be disturbed only upon a showing for abuse of this discretion. . . . Appellants must demonstrate that the district court's action "made it
" In re Fine PaperAntitrust
impossible to obtain crucial evidence ..
Litigation, 685 F.2d 810, 818 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1156, 103 S. Ct. 801, 74 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1983). .

constituted a "'gross
"
unfairness..

.

. [O]r otherwise

abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental

Id. at 90 (citations omitted). See Kennedy, supra note 56, at 248-5; Marcus, supra
note 1. Accord, Barona Group of the Captain Grande Band of Mission Indians v.
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firmed the denial of a 56(f) continuance.
Other courts have allowed more discovery, declining to
follow the Wisniewski decision. The Ninth Circuit Court in
WSB- TV v. Lee"6 reversed the dismissal of a civil rights suit
on summary judgment where the plaintiffs had not conducted discovery. In Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department,9" the court of appeals affirmed the district
court's allowance of limited discovery to test the qualified
immunity of police officers. The -dissent argued, however,
that non-conclusory allegations of an unconstitutional motive are required before a court should permit further discovery. 98 The Ninth Circuit in Barona Group of the Captain Grande Band of Mission Indians v. American
Management & Amusement, Inc.99 held that respondents
"must make clear what information is sought and how it
would preclude summary judgment." 10
Thus "inference and credibility" powers of the district
court combine with discovery discretion under the summary
judgment procedure to increase the power of the district
court. As a result, the judge now has the power to weigh the
amount of proof and make credibility determinations on the
10 1
evidence and to control that evidence.
D.

Directed Verdict and J.N.O.V.

Although the Supreme Court has not recently ruled on
standards for directed verdict and J.N.O.V. motions, the
summary judgment decisions are directly applicable. If evaluations of evidence are permitted at the summary judgment
American Mgmt. & Amusement, Inc., 824 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
_ U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 7 (1988).
96. 842 F.2d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 1988).
97. 812 F.2d 1425, 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
98. Id. at 1440.
99. 824 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1987).

100. Id. at 716 citing Garret v. City and County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d
1515, 1525 (9th Cir. 1987).
101. See, e.g., id.
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stage, they are permissible in deciding these jury-controlling
motions. The Court in Celotex alluded to the applicability
of summary judgment standards to directed verdict and
J.N.O.V. motions: "[The] standard [for granting summary
judgment] mirrors the standard for directed verdict under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 (a).. .,.
The Supreme Court's earlier pronouncements on controlling the jury gave little power to the trial judge. Now the
judge is given a role in evaluating the evidence. Moreover,
Matsushita Electric Industries v. Zenith Radio Corp.11 3 can
be seen as resolving a controversy as to what evidence a
court can consider in deciding directed verdict or J.N.O.V.
motions. Under Matsushita, a trial judge may consider all
of the evidence, including the evidence favorable to the nonmovant plus uncontradicted and undisputed evidence, or
only the evidence favorable to the non-movant. Professor
Charles Wright states that the Supreme Court had arguably
adopted a rule of allowing the trial judge to consider only
the evidence supporting the respondent in a directed verdict
or a J.N.O.V. motion."' Matsushita considers all of the evidence, both for the plaintiff and for the defendant, thus silently overruling earlier precedent. The Court, therefore,
has greatly expanded the power of the trial judge vis-A-vis
the jury.
1.

The Clearly Erroneous Rule

In addition, the new regime also has narrowed the power
of the appellate courts to review the facts found at the trial
level. It has done so by broadening the scope of the clearly
102. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.
Ed. 2d 265, 274 (1986) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 213 (1986)).
103. 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
104. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 642 (4th ed. 1983); see also
Stephens, Controlling the Civil Jury: Toward a FunctionalModel of Justification,
76 Ky. L.J. 81, 115 (1987-88).
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erroneous rule and by classifying issues as factual rather
than legal.
The Supreme Court in both Anderson v. Bessemer City,
North Carolina'0 5 and Pullman-Standard v. Swint' held
that findings of discrimination were factual rather than legal. As such, findings of discrimination are subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52's "clearly erroneous" standard of appellate review.' 07 Pullman-Standard and the
amended Rule 52 also apply the clearly erroneous rule to
"paper cases," or those cases based on documentary evidence. Earlier cases frequently held that appellate courts
could review de novo cases based on documentary evidence
because no issues of credibility were involved. 0 8
By decreasing the scope of appellate review, the Court
has placed more power in the hands of the trial judge. 0 9
Comparing Pullman-Standardwith Anderson and Matsushita reveals the new regime Court's temporal shift toward
earlier stages of procedure. Pullman-Standardlimits the review of a trial judge's fact-findings by classifying the question of racial discrimination as one of fact." 0 This fact and
law classification neatly limits appellate review by mandating the clearly erroneous standard instead of the de novo
one for matters of law. Yet, in choosing between the judge
and the jury in Matsushita and Anderson, the Court chose
the judge, even though the issues involved concerned intent
and plausibility determinations. Under these decisions, the
boundaries of fact and law shift, depending on whether the
choice of decision-maker is between the trial judge and the
105. 470 U.S. 564, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 84 L. Ed. 2d 518 (1985).
106. 456 U.S. 273, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 72 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1981).
107. See discussion in Resnik, supra note 1, at 990-1005.
108. Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950).
109. Addressing this issue, Professor Resnik states: "In Pullman-Standard,as
in the many other cases reviewed in this paper, the Supreme Court allocated
power to the first tier and diminished, if not abolished, opportunities for revision."
Resnik, supra note 1, at 1004.
110. 456 U.S. at 287-90.
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appellate court or between the trial judge and the jury. The
Supreme Court illogically but consistently puts the power in
the trial judge."'
The decoupling of the question of appellate review from
that of judge and jury allocation is a significant change
from prior law. Professor Martin Louis wrote, before the
Matsushita, Anderson and Celotex decisions, that the law
and fact classification necessarily determined the scope of
review.112 This law and fact distinction no longer exists. Today the judge can weigh the evidence in view of both the
standard of proof,"' and the inherent plausibility of a
party's theory of the case." 4 As a result, the judge may, at
the summary judgment stage, make determinations regarding the factual issues. The judge's findings, however, are
sheltered from appellate review by the clearly erroneous
rule."15
The Pullman-Standarddecision that ultimate facts are
subject to the clearly erroneous rule also changes the prior
law that appellate courts are to review ultimate facts de
novo. The Court, however, holds that the ultimate fact-findings of trial judges are subject to the "clearly erroneous"
test of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a). In Bose Corporation v. Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc.," 6
the court held that "[rlule 52(a) applies to findings of fact,
111. An exception to the limited role of the appellate courts occurs in the First

Amendment area, in which the courts of appeal are to conduct an independent
review of the record is Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of the United States, Inc.,
466 U.S. 485, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 80 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1984). In Bose, the Court

rejects a reliance on initial triers of fact.
112. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the
Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judgel
Jury Question and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C.L. REV. 993, 996 (1986) [hereinafter Louis].
113. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d

202 (1986).
114. Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct.
1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
115. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 72 L. Ed. 2d
66 (1981).
116. 466 U.S. 485, 104 S. Ct. 1949, 80 L. Ed. 502 (1984).
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including those described as 'ultimate facts' because they
'
may determine the outcome of the litigation." 117
2.

Procedural Facts

Recently, the Court has also reclassified another group of
factual circumstances so as to limit review. Courts frequently treat "procedural and evidentiary" questions as subject to a looser standard of review than that required for
substantive questions:
The percentage of procedural/evidentiary determinations that are freely reviewed is apparently much higher
than the very small percentage of equivalent determinations going to the merits. Indeed, . . . for those procedural determinations that affect outcome and do not involve subjective considerations, the percentage subject
to free review is so high as to amount almost to a presumption in favor of free review." 8
The clearly erroneous rule, however, is now being applied
to such procedural determinations. In Amadeo v. Zant,
the United States Supreme Court held that a district court's
determination on a habeas corpus petition, based on the
grounds that the petitioner's attorneys had not waived a
challenge to the racial makeup of the jury, was a factual
determination subject to Rule 52. The district court had
based its conclusion on two factors. First, the plaintiff had
difficulty in discovering a memorandum from the district attorney's office that showed an intentional design to underrepresent blacks.' Second, there was conflicting testimony
as to the deliberateness of the defense counsel's not challenging the makeup of the jury.' 2 ' The Court applied the
117. Bose, 466 U.S. at 501.
118. Louis, supra note 112, at 1038 n.334.

119. 486 U.S .
(1988).

..

108 S. Ct. 1771, 1777, 100 L. Ed. 2d 249, 261

120. 108 S. Ct. at 1777.
121. Id.
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clearly erroneous test to this procedural issue, stating:
Hence, the Court of Appeals offered factual rather

than legal grounds for its reversal of the District
Court's order, concluding that neither of the two factual

predicates for the District Court's legal conclusion was
adequately supported by the record. The Court of Ap-

peals never identified the standard of review that it applied to the District Court's factual findings. It is well
settled, however, that a federal appellate court may set
aside a trial court's findings of fact only if they are
"clearly erroneous," and that it must give "due regard
• . .to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
'
credibility of the witnesses."122

Since Professor Louis' article in 1986, the Court has subjected an entire category of factual issues, the "procedural"
issues, to the limited review of the clearly erroneous standard for appellate review.

E. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata
The Court has also broadened the application of collateral
estoppel and res judicata. It has rejected mutuality, 123 given
collateral estoppel effect to state court determinations of
Constitutional issues, 124 given res judicata effect to state
court proceedings in Title VII cases, 125 and given collateral
estoppel effect to state administrative findings. 2 ' These
cases are prime examples of the "temporal shift." Under
these cases, the new regime has shifted the decision-making
moment to a prior proceeding. Prior findings are not to be
122. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (emphasis added)).
123. Park Lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d

552 (1979).
124. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S. Ct. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1980).
125. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S. Ct. 1883,
72 L. Ed. 2d 262 (1982).
126. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 92 L. Ed. 2d
635 (1988).
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reviewed in a second hearing, although the 'fairness' of pre2 7
clusion is to be reviewed.1
Professor Judith Resnik states, "The message is clear: finality and the preservation of resources are paramount, and
the techniques by which to achieve these goals is endorsement of first tier decision making."' 1 28 Through these decisions the court not only chooses first-tier decision-making,
but it also chooses a process of decision-making that may
evade the authority of the jury. For example, if the prior
decision involved injunctive relief 129 or an administrative
agency, 131 parties may not receive a jury determination of
the facts. In Park Lane Hosiery v. Shore,13 1 the court did
not even see the lack of a jury as a procedural hindrance
comparable to defending in an inconvenient forum.13 2 In
giving collateral estoppel effect to a prior decision by a
judge, the Court not only deprives a party of a jury determination on that issue but also downgrades the Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover 33 decision. Beacon held that a court
had to schedule the determination of legal issues prior to
equitable ones in order to preserve the party's jury right.
The Beacon ruling upheld a party's right to a trial by jury,
pointing out that "[tihis court has long emphasized the importance of the jury trial. ' 1 3 4 The Beacon court reasoned:
This long-standing principle of equity dictates that only
under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances
which in view of the flexible procedures of the Federal
Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury
trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination
127.
L. Ed.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Park Lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333, 99 S. Ct. 645, 647, 58
2d 552, 554 (1979).
Resnik, supra note 1, at 974.
Park Lane, 439 U.S. 322.
University of Tenn., 478 U.S. at 788.
Park Lane, 439 U.S. 322.
Park Lane, 439 U.S. at 331, n.19.

133. 359 U.S. 500, 79 S. Ct. 948, 3 L. Ed. 2d 988 (1959).
134. 359 U.S. at 510, n.18.
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of equitable claims. .

.

467

. As we have shown, this is far

from being such a case."3 5

In Park Lane, however, the Court trivializes Beacon's
protection of the right to a jury as "no more than a general
prudential rule.' 3 6 Therefore, Park Lane merely mirrors
the summary judgment cases in choosing an efficient, earlystage procedure over the right to a jury.
III.

Problems of the New Regime

Although championed as efficient, the new regime
presents several problems. First, it conflicts with certain
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Seventh Amendment. Second, it works against the institution of the private attorney
general. Third, and most troubling, it deprives certain parties of their rights to relief.
Most, if not all, of these problems stem from the fact that
the new regime is a creation of the judiciary, with some help
from the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure. The new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the
new interpretations given the old rules have been inserted
into a procedural system based on a different premise. Rule
I l's precept of "well-founded in fact," for example, has
been interjected into a system where the burden is on the
defendant to show "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.' 13 7 As a result, there is, necessarily, a conflict between the new rules and the old ones.
Besides the conflict with the Rules, the new regime also
conflicts with substantive law and the Constitution, authorities that should govern procedure. Furthermore, the new regime works to defeat Congress' creation of causes of action
135. Id. (citations omitted).
136. Park Lane, 439 U.S. at 334.
137. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80,
84 (1951).
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under the securities laws and RICO, both of which assume
that it is possible to have hidden frauds that the private bar
is to ferret out.
Finally, it may be that the new regime's "temporal shift"
places the decision-making at the wrong stage. The decisions never discuss what is the optimum way to decide facts,
although that is the question that the courts should be
asking.
A.

Conflicts with the Rules

The Court amended Rule 11 in the context of criticisms
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing pretrial
practice. In Professor Arthur Miller's opinion, the result is
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)'s requirement
of "a short and plain statement of the claim," is an inadequate access barrier. 38 The problem is that the Court
amended Rule 11 without formally changing Rules 8, 12
and 56, and, more importantly, without addressing the policy reasons for their present forms. This leads to one of the
new regime's most blatant contradictions in that any stringent pleading requirement conflicts with Rule 8's requirement of "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.' 39 Thus Rule 11 and
the stricter interpretations of Rule 9 represent a quasi-return to Code pleading.14
Some interpretations of Rule 11's requirement that "the
pleading . . . [be] well grounded in fact,"'' together with
the more stringent fact pleading rules, create a conflict with
the policies that the discovery rules embody. All the facts
are not known at the outset, and a significant portion of the
factual basis of many lawsuits has to be developed after the
138.
139.

MILLER,
FED. R.

140.

JAMES

supra note 11, at 7-8 ("toothless tigers").
Cv. P. 8(a)(2).

&

HAZARD,

supra note 43, at 154.

141. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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' the Court recogstart of the case. In Hickman v. Taylor, 42
nized that

[t]he pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism established by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most significant
innovations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under the prior federal practice, the pre-trial functions
of notice-giving issue-formulation and fact-revelation
were performed primarily and inadequately by the
pleadings. Inquiry into the issues and the facts before
trial was narrowly confined and was often cumbersome
in method. The new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the
deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the
preparation for trial. The various instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a device, along with the pre-trial
hearing under Rule 16, to narrow and clarify the basic
issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the existence or
whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues. Thus civil
trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on
in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest
possible knowledge of the issues and facts before
trial."1 43
Mr. Popofsky interpreted Rules 11 and 56 to mean that a
plaintiff's attorney had to know the facts before filing the
lawsuit.144 The correctness of Mr. Popofsky's interpretation
is doubtful because Rule 11 has to be read in conjunction
142. 329 U.S. 495, 67 S. Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451 (1947).

143. 329 U.S. at 500-501 (citations omitted).
144. Mr. Popofsky specifically stated:

Thus, in some cases, a plaintiffs request for further discovery under
Rule 56(f) prior to a hearing on summary judgment motion could constitute an admission that the complaint does not conform to Rule 11,
and the district court therefore would not abuse its discretion by denying the Rule 56(f) request.
Popofsky, supra note 12, at 212.
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with the other rules, such as the discovery rules. The three
summary judgment cases' 45 all gave ample opportunity to
develop discovery. Matsushita, for example, dragged
through years of extensive discovery. 4 '
Yet, the mere fact that a coherent argument can be made
that a Rule 56(f) request is a violation of Rule 11 shows the
dangers of Rule 11. As stated above, Rule 11 conflicts with
the Conley 147 rule, which placed the burden on the defend-

ant to prove any summary judgment motion. Rule 11 also
conflicts with the discovery rules, which are based on the
premise that the facts are not known at the pleading stage
but have to be found out through a lawyer's investigation.
The summary judgment cases also conflict with the general
structure of the rules by conflating the tests for directed verdict and the summary judgment, thus making the summary
judgment procedure into a "full trial-before-trial."' 48 Such a
procedure radically changes the focus of the rules, which
was to lead the case up to trial. The United States Supreme
Court has decided to initiate this "temporal shift" on its
1 49
own, without going through the Enabling Act procedure.
The judiciary created many of the rules of the new regime
sua sponte without attorney comment or congressional oversight, thus giving the Federal Rules a patchwork quality. 5 °
B.

Conflicts with the Seventh Amendment

The new rules may conflict with the Seventh Amendment
because the emphasis on stricter pleadings prevents many
parties from receiving a trial by jury. The Court's temporal
shift toward allowing the trial judge to adjudicate factual
issues poses a severe threat to the American jury system.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See cases cited supra notes 49-51.
Sherman, The Matsushita Case, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1121, 1127 (1987).
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1951).
Mullenix, supra note 88, at 468.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1984).
Stempel, supra note 53, at 181-87.
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The central issue under the new regime is how much of the
evidence may the trial court adjudicate?'
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby"5 2 the Court ruled that the
judge must consider the standard of proof, but the type of
credibility determinations made by the judge in making this
determination must invade the province of the jury. 5 ' Justice Brennan, in his dissenting opinion, stated that weighing
the evidence's "caliber or quality," its "one-sided" nature,
and the reasonableness of finding for the plaintiff must involve the judge in evidentiary determinations that have tra54
ditionally been the province of the jury.1
Matsushita's rejection of the plaintiff's expert also invades the factfinder's province.155 Professor Jeffrey Stempel
states that Matsushita takes fact adjudication away from
the Jury where the Court's ideology is involved. Specifically,
Matsushita is disturbing as well in that it implicitly
suggests that the economic or social theories accepted
by the Court majority, even if not based on facts of record in the proceeding, can justify a court ruling for a
summary judgment movant as a matter of law when the
dispute between the parties is one of fact rather than
151. Calkins states: "Some evaluation is an inevitable part of deciding motions

for summary judgment and directed verdict. The genuine dispute between the majority and minority concerns the appropriate breadth of the jury's discretion and
the persuasiveness of the plaintiffs case." S. Calkins, supra note 16, at 1126,
n.464.
152. 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 202 (1986).
153. Anderson, 477 U.S. 242.
154. 477 U.S. at 267-68 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Stempel, supra note 53,

at 115-16. Commenting on Anderson, Professor Stempel stated that
the Court removed from the jury one of its traditional roles in litigation-to interpret conduct and decide whether it was "reasonable,"
"negligent,"

"reckless,"

"intentional,"

"indifferent,"

"fraudulent,"

"knowingly false," and the myriad of other fact rulings that have traditionally been reserved to the jury pursuant to the Seventh Amend-

ment and traditional federal court practices.
Stempel, supra note 53, at 115.
155. 475 U.S. 564, 601-06, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1362-67, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 560-65
(1986) (White, J., dissenting).
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56

Whether or not one agrees with Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Anderson, there is no question that the jury's role
has been downgraded. "A new era has come and . . . the

Supreme Court has not continued its vigilant watch over encroachments upon the Seventh Amendment by the courts of
appeal or state supreme courts.' 1

57

By allowing this en-

croachment, the rules of the new regime in effect take cases
away from the jury. Such an encroachment may have a substantive effect:
Judges are disproportionately drawn from upper-middle
class backgrounds, and also disproportionately white,
male and Protestant. In a recent survey, they described
themselves as more conservative than liberal. This demographic aspect of the bench also carries political impact. By comparison, the juries in most jurisdictions are
more representative of working class, minority, female
and liberal components of American society. To the extent that judges have more opportunity to influence results since Liberty Lobby, it is not unreasonable to expect over time that the results will please the uppermiddle class men, whites, Protestants and conservatives
more than they did prior to Liberty Lobby.158
C.
1.

Conflict with Substantive Goals

Appellate Review

Professor Resnik suggests that the Court's emphasis on
first tier decision making may reflect a substantive bias
against prisoners, criminal defendants, and civil rights plain156. Stempel, supra note 53, at 112.
157. Baron, Hello Eighth Circuit, Goodbye Seventh Amendment: Christine
Craft v. Metromedia, 55 UMKC L. REV. 33, 42 (1988).
158. Stempel, supra note 53, at 187.
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tiffs. 15 9 There is not a good reason, however, why these litigants could not win below or not want extensive review.
This was the case in Christine Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 6 0
where the appellate court reversed a trial court decision for
the plaintiff. The result is that civil rights plaintiffs and
criminal defendants are apt to get a better deal at the district court level than at the appellate. In Davenport v. DeRobertis'6 ' for example, Judge Richard Posner reversed a
district court injunction ordering three showers a week for
certain prisoners. Judge Posner found that showers are "cultural rather than hygienic" while indulging in fact-gathering
about foreign folks' bathing habits."6 2
159.
160.
161.
162.

Resnik, supra note 1, at 1013-15.
572 F. Supp. 868 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
844 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1316. Judge Posner stated:

In contrast, we do not think that the provision of the injunction requiring the defendants to allow the inmates to take three showers a week
has adequate support in the record or in constitutional doctrine. No
doubt Americans take the most showers per capita of any people in the
history of the world, but many millions of Americans take fewer than
three showers (or baths) a week without endangering their physical or
mental health, and abroad people as civilized and healthy as Americans take many fewer showers on average, as every tourist knows. Any
inmate of Stateville's segregation unit who wants to keep as clean as a
free person can wash himself daily, or if he wants hourly, in the sink in
his cell-a point ignored by Dr. Shansky, the medical expert for the
plaintiff class on the issue of showers. There is evidence that inmates
of the segregation unit consume on average more medical services than
nonsegregated inmates, but there is no evidence connecting this datum
to the number of showers for each group. The importance of the daily
shower to the average American is cultural rather than hygienic; as
Dr. Shuman, the defendant's expert, testified, "I know of nothing that
says that a shower is necessary more than one day a week. I believe in
this culture it is done that way but I don't know of any medical need
for it." The judge was not obliged to believe the defendant's witness,
but Dr. Shansky made the same point as Shuman when he said that
being able to take only one shower a week makes inmates feel "less
than human." While there is plenty of medical and psychological literature concerning the ill effects of solitary confinement (of which segregation is a variant), see, e.g., Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of
Solitary Confinement, 140 Am. J. Psychiatry 1450 (1983), we have
not found any corresponding literature on the effects of limiting the
number of showers that prisoners may take. The deprivation merely of
cultural amenities is not cruel and unusual punishment.
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No general bias against the civil rights litigant is necessarily implied in first tier decision making. One can, however,
find a bias against plaintiffs where discovery is necessary to
produce evidence that is in the hands of the defendant.
2.

Insufficient Discovery

The early dismissal of civil rights cases does contradict a
Congressional policy of awarding attorney fees to those who
bring these cases and thus function as private attorney
generals.'" 3 There is a need to permit private litigants to investigate these cases. 164 The early closure of civil rights lawsuits, due to rigid pleading requirements, under Rule 11,
can foreclose this type of aggressive litigation the fee-award16 5
ing statutes are designed to promote.
A statute such as RICO' assumes that there are hidden
frauds and enterprises, which cause damage, and that private litigants are in a position to sue and to collect damages
and attorney's fees.16 7 RICO is based on the paranoid assumption that racketeering activity is already taking place,
Id.
163. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative
Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986).
164. Sovern, Reconsidering Federal Civil Rule 9(b): Do We Need Particularized Pleading Requirements in Fraud Cases? 104 F.R.D. 143, 164 (1985).

165. Although civil rights cases constitute less than 8% of case filing in federal
court, they amounted to more than 22% of reported Rule 11 cases between 1983

and 1985. Unreported cases would increase those numbers, as would certain public
interest litigation (i.e., welfare or housing rights) that is not classified as "civil
rights." If the categories are broadened to include civil rights, employment discrimination, and other relevant categories, these categories account for 29.9% of
Rule 11 motions, with sanctions being granted 68% of the time. Another 25.1%
of the reported Rule 11 cases involved antitrust, RICO, and securities claims.

Such cases have in common congressionally enacted authority, often accompanied
by attorney's fees statutes. They are also uniquely targeted by Rule 11 because

their facts cannot be adequately developed until after suit, and because their theories are often on the forefront of developing law.
LaFrance, Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U.L. REv. 331,

353 (1988).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1984 & Supp.).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1984 & Supp.).
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such as embezzlement, obstruction of law enforcement, and
securities, bankruptcy, wire and mail fraud. Under the
RICO statute private litigants can sue and get treble damages plus attorney's fees.168 The Attorney General may investigate racketeering activities prior to suit pursuant to a
"civil investigative demand."'6 9 Thus Congress is legislating
on the basis that hidden fraud occurs while, on the other
hand, the judiciary is making it more difficult to litigate
against these activities. As a result, many commentators believe that "[i]f RICO should be rewritten, . . . it should be
rewritten by another branch of government."' 7 0
Furthermore, in such areas as antitrust, employment discrimination, and securities fraud, the proof needed by the
plaintiff is in the hands of the defendants. The plaintiff may
only have a suspicion that his losses are due to illegal acts.
In fact, in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems"" the
Supreme Court denied the defendant's summary judgment
motion because the evidence needed by the plaintiff in such
a case is in the hands of the conspirators.' 72 Many cases are
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
TRUST

18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1984 & Supp.).
18 U.S.C. § 1968 (1984 & Supp.).
Blakely, supra note 36, at 593.
368 U.S. 473, 82 S. Ct. 486, 7 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1962).
See Schwarzer, Summary Judgment and Case Management, 56
L.J. 213 (1987). One student writer stated:

[T]he inflexible application of the particularity requirement in contemporary securities fraud cases inevitably results in the dismissal of some
meritorious claims . . . denying the plaintiff even minimal discovery
before deciding a 9(b) motion under a rigid particularity standard has
significant social costs.
Common fraud was face-to-face while:
plaintiffs in contemporary securities fraud cases characteristically have
had contact with the defendants only indirectly, through impersonal
market channels. [I]n deciding whether to apply rule 9(b) . . . few
courts have explicitly considered either the legislative purposes of the
investor-protection statutes or the practical difficulties plaintiffs encounter in piercing the shroud of secrecy that surrounds most current
capital-market transactions. Indeed, the recent rash of dismissals
based on rigid application of rule 9(b) appears to have been sparked
not by fresh insight into the legal issues, but simply by a desire to
reduce the number of claims before the courts.
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such that important facts may only emerge after extensive
discovery. In the Dalkon Shield cases, 173 for example, the

plaintiffs were only successful after searching discovery unearthed information of the products' dangerous
characteristics.

3.

174

Bias Against the Civil Rights Attorney

One may also find a bias against the general practitioner,
the small firm, and those without the resources necessary to
conduct the discovery necessary to survive summary judgment. 17 5 Arthur LaFrance points out that civil rights cases,
RICO cases, antitrust and securities cases account for a disproportionate share of Rule 11 litigation, which targets a
particular class of practitioners. LaFrance writes:
It is not only certain classes of cases which are being
discriminated against but also certain classes of attor-

neys. Those whose clients do not have the resources or
access of great corporations or governmental agencies
are uniquely disadvantaged. Such attorneys are likely to
be small firm practitioners or are likely to be employed
by public interest groups or legal services programs.
Thus, Rule 11 targets both public interest litigation and
public interest litigators. 76
Consequently, the new regime generally favors defendants
over plaintiffs because it makes summary judgment easier to
obtain. As a result, the Court implicitly bestows a political
favor, and greater judicial power, on the litigants who can
make the most use of the summary judgment motion, the
Note, Pleading Securities Fraud Claims with ParticularityUnder Rule 9(b), 97
HARV. L. REV. 1432, 1435-39 (1984).
173. In re Dalkon Shield, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), remanded, 693
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1983).
174. Stempel, supra note 53, at 172-173.
175. Resnik, supra note 1, at 1015.
176. LaFrance, Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 VAL. U.L.
REV. 331, 353 (1988).
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defendant. "Defendants use the motion more than plaintiffs.
Defendants are disproportionately comprised of society's
'haves': banks, insurance companies, railroads, business organizations, governments, and government agencies. Plaintiffs are disproportionately comprised of society's 'havenots': individuals, business sole proprietorships, and smaller
entities."17' 7
Thus, the combination of Rule 11, the stricter use of fact
pleading, and the expanded use of summary judgment works
against congressional policy that seeks to give civil relief for
violations of civil rights and the securities and antitrust
laws.
IV.

How Facts Should Be Adjudicated

Most law review articles and court decisions fail to address the issue of how facts should be adjudicated. The Supreme Court once favored trials and jury adjudication.178
Other authorities argue that fact adjudication should be
reached through power diffusion and differentiation in decision making.' 79 The present United States Supreme Court
177. Stempel, supra note 53, at 161.
178. See, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, 368 U.S. 473, 82 S.
Ct. 486, 7 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1962).
We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the
proof is largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile

witnesses thicken the plot. It is only when the witnesses are present
and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight
to be given their testimony can be appraised. Trial by affidavit is no
substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of
,even-handed justice.'
Poller, 368 U.S. at 473.

179. Professor Resnik, for example, argues:
There are no simple, inexpensive answers or any solutions that come
problem free. The history of procedure is a series of attempts to solve
the problems created by the preceding generation's procedural reforms.

Any set of decisions made will produce unforeseen results that, in turn,
will need to be addressed. However, the current "solution" of finality,
achieved by deeming first tier decisions legitimate and by precluding

review, is premised upon the fiction that first tier evaluations of dis-
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prefers the trial judge to conduct fact adjudication rather
than the jury and the appellate court. The Court gives few
reasons, however, acting as if its choices were foreclosed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a truly circular process because the court is the body that approves the rules.
Actually, the new regime is not a product of a technical
analysis of the Federal Rules, but an outcome of a "failing
faith" in adjudication. 8 '
One may ask whether the old regime's adjudicatory process has advantages that are being discarded. The discussion
should not, however, center on a technical analysis of the
Rules and precedents, rather on determining what process is
the best. There are some points, however, that should be
recognized. First, the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution has already made a policy choice in favor of jury determination, a determination that the trial judge should not
have total decision-making power. The Court should give
the Seventh Amendment more respect than it does at present. The Court has refused to abide by the Seventh
Amendment's policy choice that the right to a jury is to be
putes are sufficient to fulfill all the purposes of procedure. Those close
to the courts know that, while there are many first tier successes, there
are also many failures. To maintain that the system is generally functioning as it should is to undermine the special ability of courts to
inquire into claims of individual errors, misdeeds and lack of concern.
If we really want speedy, inexpensive decisions, we should shift to coinflipping. If, however, we are committed to features of court procedure
other than power concentration, finality and economy, we must permit
opportunities for revision. We must construct procedural models that
diffuse power and provide differentiation among the various types of
disputes to be resolved.
Resnik, supra note 1, at 1030.
180. Professor Resnik writes:
Whether the cry is for more therapeutic methods of dispute resolution
or for "managerial judges" to control wayward attorneys and to stabilize a malfunctioning process, the requests are often the same: limit
opportunities for adjudication by judges and for trial by jury and offer
different mechanisms for the disposition of disputes.
Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
494, 497-98 (1986).
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given more weight than the right to take discovery.18 1
The older rules of the ancien regime were based on the
premise that trials produced better results: "The rules they
crafted were to enable attorneys facing off within the tradition of adversarial encounters, to provide information to
judges who would, in turn, produce acceptable, indeed perhaps good outcomes. '1 8 2 It is difficult to determine if a trial
based on documentary evidence or one based on testimony is
more accurate. There are obvious differences in the two
types of proceedings. In a summary judgment proceeding,
the court only sees "cold" documents. These documents are
often ambiguous and need explanation to be understood. At
trial, however, "the documents are ordinarily introduced
through live witnesses who not only authenticate the document but also explain its contents and significance, pointing
out specific passages, illustrating and elaborating as the document is discussed. ' 183 A trial, therefore, gives the finder of
fact the opportunity to appreciate the context of the
evidence.
A trial also serves to work against any pre-determination.
Persons considering documents tend to fill in gaps based on
their own expectations. 8 4 A trial, with its explanations
given by witnesses, can counter these projections. Would a
fact-finder have the same concept of business practices as
the Supreme Court's if Matsushita had been tried with live
witnesses?
Another advantage of trial is the "Perry Mason," event,
in which a witness may admit the truth under cross-examination in front of a black-robed judge and a jury. It is relatively easy to fudge on an affidavit, but not so easy in the
181. See, e.g., Park Lane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58
L. Ed. 552 (1979).
182. Resnik, Railing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHi. L.
REV. 494, 505 (1986).
183. Stempel, supra note 53, at 178.
184. See Bergman, Ambiguity: The Hidden Hearsay Danger Almost Nobody
Talks About, 75 Ky. L.J. 841, 861-63 (1987).
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ritual of the court room.' 8 5 The trial should not be discarded
as an expensive relic of a slower, more prosperous era.
Before returning to Code pleading, which Professor Geoffrey Hazard believes is reoccurring,186 it is important to remember the problems Code pleading generated. Rule 8 was
promulgated to end the sterile debates about how many
facts should be pled. Professor Jeffrey Stempel describes
how much delay and confusion Rule 9(b) litigation has
generated:
The uncertainty engendered by the different standards
for applying Rule 9(b) has several costs. First, it probably yields an increase in litigation under Rule 9(b). A
plaintiff who cannot tell if its complaint satisfies the
rule will probably file the complaint. A defendant who
hopes to avoid the burden of litigating a case and cannot ascertain whether the complaint is satisfactory may
move to dismiss for failure to particularize the claim
adequately. Second, forum-shopping occurs when different courts apply different rules to similar situations.
Third, the application of the same rule in different ways
in different jurisdictions promotes in inequitable administration of the law, and makes more difficult the equal
protection of the law.
In short, if a Rule 9(b) motion is used to gather information, it is inefficient. If, on the other hand, it is
used in an attempt to dismiss a case, it is not only unlikely to be successful, but in the instances in which
such motions are effective the motion may prematurely
terminate a case. The chief products of Rule9(b) are
motions are delay and confusion. 87
The solution the new regime offers to present problems is
to restore the Nineteenth Century solution of fact pleading.
Robert Blakely addresses this question of solutions and
185. Stempel, supra note 53, at 179.
186. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 43, at 154.
187. Stempel, supra note 53, at 164.
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writes:
The history of legal institutions and laws in the 20th
century has been the adaptation of the nation's 19th
century institutions and laws to 20th century problems.
If those who would reform our basic laws truly believed
that those adaptations are misguided-and they are not
merely Bourbons, forgetting nothing and learning nothing, who long for the restorations of lost privileges-they should be asked what is their new design
for our basic institutions and laws that will deal with
20th century problems. Is your only solution to restore
19th century institutions and laws? 188
Another problem with the limited review of factual issues
is the supposed greater expertise of appellate courts. In the
federal courts system, there may not be much difference in
expertise between the appellate and trial courts. Allowing
for freer review may not result in many more correct decisions."' Importing a strict "clearly erroneous" rule into
some state systems, however, could be disastrous because
there often is a great spread in competence between the trial
and the appellate bench. In some courts, even the integrity
of many lower court judges is lacking. 9 °
The judiciary, however, seems to be uninterested in close
appellate review. A principle of bureaucratic theory is that
multi-channels of review and observation must exist for effective control of subordinate organizations. This bureaucratic theory is the reason for separate reporting channels in
many organizations, including the party official in Nazi
Germany as well as the Soviet Union and the General Accounting Office in the United States federal government. 91
188. Blakely, supra note 36, at 593.
189. Resnik, supra note 1, at 1012-123.
190. See, e.g., After Greylord, NAT. C.J., Oct. 10, 1988, at 3 (reports more than
seventy convictions of Cook County judges, lawyers and court personnel).

191. A.

DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY

148 (1967).
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Conclusion
The Supreme Court of the new regime now indicates that
it does not want strict direct review of facts or collateral
review. In addition, the Court does not want to know about
the proceedings in subordinate courts and does not want
much control over them. This can only lead to greater independence and diversity of results in the lower courts. Accordingly the outcome of a case will depend more on the
particular judge an attorney draws rather than on a uniformly applied body of substantive law.192
The judiciary is going through a revolution in procedure.
For the attorney the lessons are simple. Under the new regime an attorney must do his homework, research the law
and investigate the facts before filing. He must also plead
facts and conduct thorough discovery in order to survive the
summary judgment motion, and try to win the case at trial,
because the chances of reversal may be slim. The hardpressed attorney may echo a saying attributed to Prince
Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord, "Only those who
1 93
lived before the revolution knew how sweet life could be.

192. For a general discussion of the problems of maintaining control in a bu-

reaucracy, see A.

DoWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY

(1967).

193. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1964 at 32.
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